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Abstract
This article demonstrates how South–South Cooperation (SSC), as it is now constituted
in Southeast Asia, is little more than a liberal norm retaining only echoes of its origins in
the 1955 Bandung Conference that first created SSC based on solidarity, common
interests, and sovereignty. Southeast Asia is a useful case study of SSC’s evolution, as its
states have been major players over the decades – with Indonesia proposing the Bandung
Conference, Malaysia playing a key role in the 1980s, and Indonesia again at the forefront
of the region from the first years of the new century onwards. Thailand and Singapore
also have notable SSC programmes. However, the practices of SSC in the region show
that it has become a liberal norm based on one key instrument – technical cooperation
programmes. The process of SSC norm internalisation has occurred through a complex
webbing of the interests and ideas of Southeast Asia’s states, regional dynamics, and
Northern donor interests.
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Introduction
South–South Cooperation (SSC) is a messy concept. It came originally out of the
Bandung Conference, promoting a vision of emancipatory, state-led development with
the Global South working in solidarity against the Global North. It envisioned a broad
range of economic, cultural, and technical cooperation initiatives among developing
countries to this end. The United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation’s
(UNOSSC, 2018) definition of SSC still pays homage to this heritage, describing it as a
“broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains.” However, in practice, as
an administrative apparatus grew around SSC – in particular after the 1978 UN Buenos
Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) – the focus became mostly on planned projects of Tech-
nical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). Some larger Southern donors
also provide economic cooperation, mostly as loans. However, the original focus on
cultural cooperation, creating progressive global governance structures, and combatting
Northern hegemony have been lost. In other words, SSC started as a counter-hegemonic
project but has shifted to become driven by a technical, depoliticised agenda over time –
one much more in line with traditional aid practices (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018).
One of the key instruments now associated with SSC is triangular cooperation, which
the UNOSSC defines as traditional donors and multilaterals facilitating SSC initiatives.
The definitions of it are, in fact, contested, and the membership and roles of participants
can change over time (OECD, 2018). While triangular cooperation started as a distinct
instrument, it has become deeply entwined with SSC as traditional donors are now
utilising it to “influence the norms and practices of Southern cooperation providers and
recipients” (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013: 1484) and to enhance their legitimacy
through association with Southern cooperation.
Most academic attention has been given to SSC efforts by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) grouping. Southeast Asia, in contrast, has had little
attention paid to it despite the fact that the very idea of SSC owes a lot to one of the
region’s key nations, Indonesia. Further, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore also all have
programmes that have expanded in tandem with global SSC efforts over the past decade
(see Table 1). The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam have small programmes but have
not expanded like the countries studied here. The significance often placed on the
activities of the BRICS is questionable; as Ravi Palat argues, they have in fact been timid
in their challenges to “the Euro-North American domination of world affairs” (2008:
721). This is still the situation today. Indeed, the Western capitalist order provides the
foundation for the BRICS’ development projects and consequently they support – at
times rather enthusiastically – the current system of global economic governance (Bond,
2015; Robinson, 2015). However, the BRICS have generated a new contestation over
the “purposes, modalities and geographic orientation of aid and, in particular whether
aid should be increasingly harnessed to commercial agendas” (Rosser and Tubilewicz,
2016: 7). Some of this contestation was more for show than of substance, as old or
traditional donor motivations have always incorporated their own national economic
and strategic interests. In recent years, most of the BRICS have seen their economic
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progress slow down, and this has held back their SSC activities too. China has the
largest programme and remains active, yet it is now regarded with some trepidation by
many Southern recipients.
Traditional donors – those belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – have been
critical of “new” donors on a range of fronts and sought to further distinguish out their
own aid practices through a series of High Level Forums (HLFs) on Aid Effectiveness.1
The Busan 2011 HLF included for the first time not just aid recipients but civil society
organisations and SSC providers. A new agenda had formed: the “orderly and formal
inclusion [of SSC] in the global governance structure of international development
cooperation” (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013: 1480). Moreover, old and new donors
have largely converged around the primacy of economic growth for development
(Fejerskov et al., 2016). The few left-of-centre Latin American states, in particular
Venezuela and Cuba, that previously attempted to provide a more substantive challenge
to development paradigms have dwindled in number and influence due to their own
recent economic and political crises.
Emma Mawdsley (2012) has argued that the emergence of non-BRICS donors is a
major challenge to the existing donor system. Nils-Sjard Schulz, meanwhile, posits that
they offer “a welcome middle way between the traditional DAC donors and the BRIC
push for global power stakes” (2010: 5). Equally, it is commonplace to emphasise both
the potentials and the limitations of new donors and their diversity (de Renzio and
Seifert, 2014; Quadir, 2013). A case study of Southeast Asia, which as noted has been
Table 1. Indicators of the Size, Geographical Focus, and Focus of SSC by Southeast Asian
Countries (Budgets in USD Unless Specified).
Country Scale of SSC Geographical focus Sectoral focus
Indonesia 2000–2013: USD
49.8 million; 2013
budget USD
5.64 million
ASEAN countries,
especially CLMV
Agriculture, population and family
planning, village empowerment,
education, disaster
preparedness
Malaysia 2006 budget USD
16 million 2,000
trained 1980–2011
ASEAN countries,
especially CLMV,
Central Asia, and
Muslim countries
Public administration, agriculture,
poverty alleviation, ICT,
banking, English language
Thailand Budget 2010 USD
12 million (2014
THB 2.82 billion)
ASEAN countries,
especially CLMV
(strong focus on Laos)
Infrastructure (especially
transport), agriculture, public
health, education, banking,
economics
Singapore Almost 7,000 people
trained per year;
80,000 1992–2011
ASEAN countries,
especially CLMV, small
developing island states
Transportation (sea, air, land),
economic policy, and
environment
Source: Author’s own compilation, from government websites and reports.
Note: CLMV ¼ Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam; ICT ¼ information and communications technology.
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subject to very little academic scrutiny, is therefore useful to shed light on the domestic
and international dynamics at play in this setting – and, indeed, to inform the broader
analysis of the impact and direction of non-BRICS SSC.
Theoretical Considerations: SSC from Gramsci to Norms
The article offers a neo-Gramscian analysis; however, it also engages with the
constructivist literature on norm diffusion. The neo-Gramscian framework builds on
previous research regarding the hegemonic neo-liberal development system, best called
the post–Washington Consensus (PWC), which aims not so much to promote develop-
ment as it does to globalise market-based development and capitalist political–economic
relations across society (Cammack, 2012; Carroll, 2015; Engel, 2010). This produces
scrutiny of how the ideological and political focus of dominant groups is affecting the
theoretical, social, and political framework of SSC in Southeast Asia. This is a contested
process that involved struggles, compromise, and a strong focus on ideas and the making
of common sense.
Norm theorising also forms part of the analysis – not with the aim of creating a new
synthesis with neo-Gramscianism, but because it has overlapping interests with such a
framework when it comes to analysing non-structural change. Norms are standards “of
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:
891) and the literature developed to understand change. From a Gramscian approach,
norms have only limited engagement with power (material and otherwise) and do not
give adequate attention to underlying social relations of production as the basis for
social order (Wills, 2017). Norms scholars have often focused on case studies of
progress in promoting human rights broadly understood, but norm research can also be
agnostic about the nature and level of social change (Acharya, 2004). A Gramscian
approach is always focused on what inhibits and what progresses social change.
However, norm literature offers a modern language and relatively developed frame-
work for evaluating change, and one which has not been applied to SSC. This eclectic
theoretical framework and the specific focus on Southeast Asia differentiate the article
from existing analyses of SSC and produces in-depth engagement with both domestic
and regional drivers of diffusion.
The emergence of SSC fits one pattern identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) in
that it emerged internationally and then thereafter influenced domestic and regional
agendas too. The first phase of SSC ran from the end of World War II through to the mid-
1970s (Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010). It emerged from counter-hegemonic ideals and with
close connections to Southeast Asia, before spreading out across the globe.2 However,
the progressive Bandung ideals and the movements to promote them provoked a sig-
nificant backlash; Morais de Sa e Silva’s (2010) second phase of SSC from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s was, as such, a quiet period, one that saw the SSC agenda
atrophy. It was during this period that SSC, for the most part, can best be understood as
shifting from being a counter-hegemonic ideal to a norm based on the instrument of
technical cooperation; this only really became apparent during the third, current phase
of SSC, however.
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Thus, using a constructivist frame, SSC’s “tipping point” to emerge as an accepted
norm (or “norm cascade”) slowly came about in this second phase (Finnemore and Sik-
kink, 1998). Southeast Asia was somewhat insulated from the backlash against devel-
opmentalism and the economic havoc that the 1980s wreaked on many developing
countries. Thus, during this period, Malaysia – under PrimeMinister Mahathir Mohamad –
became the leading SSC proponent. The ebb and flow of these first two phases of SSC in
Southeast Asia are the focus of the next section of the article. The third, or current, phase of
SSC – which dates from the mid-1990s – is the focus of the second section of the article.
This era has seen SSC re-emerge, cascade, and become internalised – the latter being
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) final phase of the norm life cycle.
Overall, the neo-Gramscian approach taken focuses the article on the meaning
and content of SSC as part of a global battle of ideas over development – but one
that is linked to local contestations over modes of production and leadership. SSC
has been transformed through what Gramsci (1971) calls making things “common
sense” and what constructivists call norm internalisation. The norms literature
provides the framework for examining the dynamics of each phase of the debate in
Southeast Asia. The case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore
demonstrate how the shift of SSC in Southeast Asia from a counter-hegemonic idea
to one that is friendly to neo-liberal development has involved the entwining of
global, regional, and local politics.
A Brief History of SSC in Southeast Asia
Phase One: The Emergence of SSC
SSC emerged originally in response to the Cold War, when newly independent countries
sought a path between the superpowers. The Final Communique´ of the 1955 Bandung
Conference promoted not just technical cooperation among Asian–African states but
also outlined a range of areas wherein participants aimed to expand economic and
cultural cooperation as well as support for their collective development. Its emancipatory
aims were also evident in the support for human rights, equality, state sovereignty, and
non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, with this last point targeted not just at
the Cold War superpowers but also at the colonial powers.
Following its inception at Bandung, SSC – in its broadest sense – established an
institutional framework with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) established in 1961
and the Group of 77 (G77) established in 1964, which also promoted economic and
technical cooperation. SSC emerged at a time when development thinking was sympa-
thetic to such ideas, when it was neither really left-leaning nor right-leaning; rather, there
was a broad consensus that there should be more government intervention in the econ-
omy than previously (Rapley, 2002). These ideas were backed by the emergent Bretton
Woods institutions and government-to-government transfers as key sources of capital
flows for many developing countries. However, in the end, the outcomes of SSC efforts
were limited: there were some preferential trade deals and a few development projects
started, the most prominent of which involved China and India.
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Indonesia was the Southeast Asian country with the most substantive involvement
in early SSC efforts, leading by proposing and hosting the Bandung Conference in
April 1955. The norm literature suggests that “norm entrepreneurs” play a key role in
developing a critical mass around norms in the first phase of norm emergence (Fin-
nemore and Sikkink, 1998), while Gramsci (1971) emphasises the role of leadership in
ideological change. Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, undoubtedly played such a
role for SSC along with other Southern leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, U Nu, Zhou
Enlai, and Gamal Abdel Nasser. This was a remarkable group that the term “norm
entrepreneurs” does not do justice to, though they certainly developed a powerful
framing of, or ideology for, SSC found in the Bandung Conference’s Declaration on
Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation. This was centred on self-determination,
mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs,
and equality. However, this leadership was faced with a myriad of challenges and had
their limitations, both of which factors contributed to the limited progression of their
ideals – including SSC.
For Indonesia, Bandung solidified the elite’s view that the country should play a
leadership role among postcolonial nations and in Asia too and that its foreign policy
should be “independent and active” (Weinstein, 1976; Wicaksana, 2016). Under Sukarno,
Indonesia was a leader of, and active participant in, many political and practical SSC
initiatives, though the number of projects remained small (Engel, 2017). Elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, there was little involvement in SSC; Thailand started providing some aid
to other countries as early as 1963, mostly to its neighbours, and it was not part of broader
SSC efforts at the time. The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in 1967 could be seen as part of the emergence of SSC, yet in practice it was a
small, pro-Western grouping that did little to progress SSC.
Phase Two: SSC Cascades
The second phase of SSC – the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s – saw reduced cooperation
globally due to an inward turn after the economic turbulence of the 1970s, the
developing-country debt crisis, and the subsequent neo-liberal (or Washington Con-
sensus) structural adjustment programmes (Gosovic, 2016; Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010).
SSC slowed, but an institutional structure slowly developed around it – or rather around
TCDC, with the 1978 BAPA. Its counter-hegemonic ideals are clear in the foreword –
BAPA sought to provide a
blueprint for major changes in approaches to development assistance and for a dramatically
heightened emphasis on national and collective self-reliance among developing countries as
foundations for a new international economic order. (UNDP, 1978: 3)
Technical cooperation, meanwhile, was
regarded as facilitating not only the spread of expertise, but also political solidarity between
Southern states vis-a`-vis an exploitative and “neocolonial” set of Northern state and private
interests. (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018: 873)
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BAPA was supported by a UN Special Unit for SSC. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)
argue that institutionalisation in rules and organisations represents a “tipping point” for a
norm. However, progress was very slow after 1978, and multilateral economic cooper-
ation among developing countries reduced (Kumar, 2008). There was, in fact, an active
backlash against SSC from Northern countries – they unilaterally withdrew from inter-
national development dialogue in 1981, and partook in an “across the board ‘cold war’
offensive against the developing countries” (Gosovic, 2016: 734), including against their
SSC efforts. Many of the elites in the South were prepared to abandon SSC ideals and
focus on their own enrichment, and the debt crisis and structural adjustment disciplined
those who did not repudiate these ideals and also many of those who did.
Southeast Asia avoided the worst impacts of the debt crisis, though structural
adjustment came into play after the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. In the meantime,
the region benefitted from the expansion of Japanese and other regional production
networks and the shift away from governmental towards private capital flows – which
negatively affected most other developing regions. Given the relatively strong position
of many countries in the region, it is not surprising that a key norm entrepreneur for SSC
in the early 1980s came from Southeast Asia; this time, it was Malaysia’s Mahathir. The
Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP) was established in 1980 fol-
lowing the UN’s BAPA and before Mahathir became prime minister, but it still became
synonymous with him. Mahathir is said to have been motivated by a personal opposition
to Western hegemony and a desire to reform the rules of the international order (Dosch,
2014; Hamid, 2005).
In 1985, Mahathir announced that the country’s SSC objectives included expanding
international economic cooperation and reducing dependence on developed countries. In
1989, he was said to have played a central role in the establishment of the Group of 15
(G-15) developing countries, which focused on cooperation in investment, trade, and
technology (Hamid, 2005). This group took up SSC as a major theme in the second
decade of twenty-first century. However, Mahathir’s adoption of the progressive lan-
guage of SSC cannot hide the political and economic interests driving his policies. As
Jayaratnam Saravanamuttu argues, Mahathir’s foreign policy was Malaysia’s
“authoritarian capitalist political regime seeking its ‘neo-mercantilist’ niche in the
rapidly changing international division of labour of a post–Cold War regional and global
political realignment” (2010: 185). Thus, Mahathir’s role as SSC’s norm entrepreneur
was ultimately not overly effective, as he did not have sufficient legitimacy among Third
World countries.
In Indonesia, the brutal coming to power of Suharto saw the country take an early turn
inward on SSC. In the 1980s, the debt crisis affected as the country and it came (again)
under the discipline of theWorld Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a
period. Suharto’s rule saw Indonesia’s status as a non-aligned nation questioned in the
1970s (Weinstein, 1976). In 1981, the Suharto government established the Indonesian
Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP). This was likely as much driven by norm cas-
cading through the BAPA and regional rivalry with Malaysia as by a genuine commitment
to SSC. Late in the Suharto era, there was a brief attempt to reinstate a more independent
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foreign policy, but it was driven by concerns about shoring up Suharto’s domestic hege-
mony rather than by SSC priorities.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Philippines hosted a G77 meeting in 1976 whose
communique´ endorsed economic and technical cooperation. It established the Technical
Assistance Council of the Philippines (TACP) in May 1979 – in order to comply with
international obligations under BAPA (Trinidad, 2014). TACP was replaced by the
Technical Cooperation Council of the Philippines in 1992. As Trinidad notes, the pro-
gramme has proved to be “stagnant and very modest in terms of its budget and scope”
(2014: 47).
Singapore, under Lee Kuan Yew, did little on SSC internationally or regionally,
despite his “Asian values” rhetoric. Nevertheless, norm cascading appears to have been
at play as the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) was established in 1992 under
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1990–2004). Thailand had little interest in SSC at the
start of the second phase, its technical cooperation and training programmes with its
neighbours had subsided as they became socialist or communist (Trinidad, 2014). It did
start to establish a leadership role in ASEAN during the Cambodia crisis of the late 1970s
(Emmers, 2014), and such national security concerns remain a key driver for its pro-
grammes today. In 1991, with the end of the Cold War, Thailand created a special fund
for its neighbours – and it henceforth did become active in SSC (Trinidad, 2014). Japan,
meanwhile, notably started its first triangular cooperation programme in 1975 – the
Third Country Training Program – and it went on to become a pioneer of triangular
cooperation (Trinidad, 2014).
These piecemeal and small-scale efforts in Southeast Asia meant that it was more
active than most regions in the second phase of SSC, and thus it did play a role in its re-
emergence at the end of the last century. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 saw
countries in the region again subject to the influence of the WB and IMF, now in their
PWC phase. But the backlash to their dictates promoted some new cooperation in the
region, notably the Chiang Mai Initiative (on currency swaps) and the start of the
ASEANþ arrangements.
Phase Three: SSC as an Accepted Norm
The current phase of SSC dates from the mid-1990s up until the present day and has seen
SSC pass a tipping point to become an accepted norm. SSC’s growth is related to the
burgeoning interest in multilateralism after the end of the Cold War and to the rising
economic and political importance of emerging economies in the early years of the new
century – in particular China. Left-of-centre governments in certain Latin American
states gave SSC “a pronounced political and emancipatory bent” (Gosovic, 2016: 735)
and structural economic implications. However, the BRICS nations became the key
leaders of SSC; this gradually shifted it in more traditional directions. This can be seen in
creation of the New Development Bank and of the even more traditionally structured
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of which entrench traditional modes
of development finance (Bazbauers and Engel, 2016).
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This phase has retained some of the traditional focus on politics but also added “new
energy, new actors and new practices” (Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010: 4). It first gained
momentum in around 2003, as shown by the progression of international conferences and
related declarations (Morais de Sa e Silva, 2010). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)
emphasise the importance of international organisations and networks in the norm
cascade phase. No longer able to stop SSC – indeed, with the relevance of key Western
aid institutions such as the DAC now in question – traditional donors have embraced
SSC via the hitherto distinct instrument of triangular cooperation, with the result that it is
now ubiquitous for donors and recipients to speak of South–South and Triangular
Cooperation (SSTC) (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). The UNOSCC is now responsible
for promoting both, and thus an SSTC bureaucracy has been established. SSC is an
accepted and internalised norm; SSTC lags not far behind, though China largely rejects
triangular cooperation and the DAC’s aim of formalising SSC operations and principles
through the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013).
Developed countries have attributed their growing interest in triangular
arrangements to the level of “developing country ‘ownership’ of” SSC projects”
(United Nations General Assembly, 2009: 12); however, triangular cooperation
gives traditional donors a more explicit role in, and control over, related activities
(Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). It also helps to frame development not as a joint
struggle for sovereign advancement but as a series of problems to be addressed by
technical interventions (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). Further, financing for SSC is
overall very limited, and Northern capital is still central to many of these efforts –
demonstrating its traditional disciplinary power.3 This could be described as a case
of a norm being reframed to “limit the range of choices and constrain actions”
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894).
However, this is about more than just limiting choices. SSC in its early form posed an
existential threat to the Northern-dominated capitalist world; this was a case of creating a
new common sense around SSC as a technical assistance norm, which could then be
tamed. Given the power of China, in particular, the North could not ignore SSC or
discredit it; instead, they worked to reshape it to fit with the existing global order. This
also suited the desire of many Northern donor states to reduce aid budgets (the “beyond
aid agenda”) (Eyben, 2012). Japan was the first traditional donor to provide significant
such support and has been a major backer of Southeast Asian efforts (United Nations
General Assembly, 2009). Japan has a large overall aid programme in absolute terms, but
this represents only small as a percentage of its gross national income (GNI), and it is
dominated by loans over grants – thus SSTC suits its modalities.
SSC has cascaded through Southeast Asia since the early years of the new century,
mostly through TCDC. Malaysian leadership declined after Mahathir’s retirement, but
the MTCP nevertheless continued to expand. Indonesia was quiet until the election of
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, and during his presidency, the country showed a
level of activism not seen since the Bandung era. In 2006, Thailand “officially
announced the new role of Thailand as an ‘Emerging Donor’ after more than 40 years as
an ‘Aid Recipient Country’” (Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a: 6). Singapore
has expanded its spending on SSC projects, though it prefers to keep its activities quiet.
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The following section outlines the various SSC activities and analyses the motivations
for those, of each of these major players since the start of this century.
SSC Programmes in Southeast Asia
Indonesia
Indonesia was still in the throes of its post-Suharto restructuring during the early years of
this third phase of SSC. Yudhoyono revived Indonesia’s founding discourse of partici-
pation in global peace and social justice efforts (Agensky and Barker, 2012), and SSC
became a prominent theme of his presidency. Along with an active and independent
foreign policy, Yudhoyono (2008) argued that that the country needed an “all-direction
foreign policy.”4 Despite the renewed activism, analysts saw Indonesia as remaining
quite a conservative foreign policy actor (Anwar, 2010; Sukma, 2011). This is a fair
assessment, and Yudhoyono’s focus on international legitimacy was likely driven by a
desire to shore up his domestic legitimacy; though, when viewed in the Southeast Asian
context, Indonesia looks rather less conservative.
Indonesia’s resurgent SSC agenda emerged shortly after Yudhoyono’s election, with
the prominently celebrated fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference. The April
2005 meeting of 89 Asian and African countries in Jakarta adopted the Declaration on
the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership. This committed to
practical and sustainable cooperation based on comparative advantage, equal partnership,
common ownership and vision, as well as a firm and shared conviction to address common
challenges. (Asia-Africa Summit, 2005: 4)
In practice, Indonesia’s SSC has not had a significant focus on Africa because its
strategic priorities are in Asia. Indonesia became co-chair of the Task Team on South-
South Co-operation in 2008; this was a Southern-led platform, but hosted by the OECD-
DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, which aimed to enhance SSC knowledge
(Task Team on South-South Cooperation, 2011). Knowledge sharing has been a key
emphasis for Indonesia. In 2009, SSC was included in the “Jakarta Commitment: Aid For
Development Effectiveness, Indonesia’s Road Map to 2014.” This was about reconfi-
guring Indonesia’s relationship with traditional donors – and its own role as a donor
provided a key rationale for that. Signatories to the Jakarta Commitment pledged to
support Indonesia’s SSC efforts (Government of Indonesia and its Development Part-
ners, 2009), though only some donors actually do so in practice. In 2010, SSC was even
included in the Medium-Term National Development Plan 2010–2014.
Indonesian SSC has also had some focus on political cooperation. It was a driving
force behind the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established
in 2009, the Human Rights Declaration in 2012, and the Bali Democracy Forums. Some
scholars see these directions taken as being about Indonesia’s global image (Sukma,
2011), while others see more significant transformations at play (Acharya, 2015). Cer-
tainly, there is a strong performative element in Indonesia’s SSC; a common discourse is
repeated across SSC and foreign policy documents about the country’s historical and
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contemporary centrality to Southern solidarity (Engel, 2017).5 Brigg et al. argue that
these engagements reflect Indonesia’s unique pathway, and its resultant capacity to
embrace both “diversity and substantial illiberality” (2016: 419). However, the more
important point here is that Indonesia’s focus on human rights differentiates it from other
countries in the region and breaks with the Bandung principles, which prioritised non-
interference. This is both a unique path in the region and, at the same time, suggests
influence by Northern ideologies and donors, given their own emphasis on democracy.
Indonesia is also the only country in the region that seems to have taken any SSC
initiative in economics, or more specifically trade. The 2014 Law 7 on Trade Policy says
that: “The Government may provide unilateral trade preferences to the less developed
countries while maintaining the national interest” (Law of the Republic of Indonesia,
2014). In practice, however, national interest seems to be the dominant concern; Indo-
nesia has adopted measures across a range of areas that liberal economists call trade
restrictions and “bad policy” but that are developmentalist in intent. They mostly affect
trade with developing states, though (Patunru and Rahardja, 2015).
Indonesia’s efforts to progress its SSC have been strongest in technical cooperation
where, historically, its programmes were fragmented. They include the ITCP (a South–
South training and exchange programme), the NAM Centre for South-South Technical
Cooperation, along with quite a number of small programmes conducted by a range of
ministries.6 The bulk of the funding for these activities has long come from traditional
donors. The estimated value of activities between 2000 and 2013 was around USD 49.8
million (Mauludiah, 2013). Geographically, Indonesia’s TCDC has prioritised ASEAN’s
new member states – namely, the CLMV countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam. Key sectors of activity within the ITCP, meanwhile, have been agriculture,
education (this includes scholarships), and national population and family planning
(Indonesia South-South Technical Cooperation, 2010). Knowledge sharing has been a
major focus of Indonesia’s more recent efforts (Sofjan et al., 2014).
In 2006, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) restructure established a Directorate
on Technical Cooperation (CEACoS, 2010) – showing the growing bureaucratisation of
SSC, a feature of norm internalisation. In 2010, a Coordination Team on SSTC was
established, and they drafted plans for Indonesia’s future SSC undertakings with sig-
nificant support from JICA. In 2011, a Draft Grand Design and Blue Print was published
(JICA and PT Indokoei International, 2011); the Coordination Team has been working
towards a Master Plan. Other input was provided from the German Gesellschaft fu¨r
Internationale Zusammenarbeit and the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment. The depth of engagement by traditional donors in assisting Indonesia frame its
SSC programme demonstrates how they seek to shape new donors and mould their
approaches and activities based on DAC principles and norms (Abdenur and Da Fonseca,
2013). Further, Indonesia’s programmes are now framed as SSTC, not SSC, and the
planning documents posit SSTC as a “complement” to North–South cooperation (Sofjan
et al., 2014). This is a radical reframing of SSC away from its Bandung origins in self-
determination and equality. It is also notable that the Draft Grand Design frames SSTC in
terms of benefits to the Indonesian economy – there is no analysis made of partner
countries’ needs.7 National interest has always been a central driver of aid, though it was
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downplayed by many traditional donors during the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury. In East Asia though, national interest has remained a key goal of aid programmes
(Rosser and Tubilewicz, 2016) and has returned to prominence some traditional donors.
SSC has been continued by President Joko Widodo (2014–present), though there are
differences now emerging. The focus on advancing the country’s role as a middle
power and on SSC was included as one of the items in Jokowi’s Nine Development
Priorities Agenda – his official policy platform (Parameswaran, 2014; Tahalele, 2015).
Like Yudhoyono, shortly after his election Widodo led an anniversary of Bandung –
this time the sixtieth one. Widodo’s opening speech employed some fairly emphatic
language, reminiscent of the early years of SSC. He said (2015) that the world “today is
still fraught with global injustice, inequality, and violence,” that rich nations consume
70 per cent of the planet’s resources, and that there is an unequal structure of financial
management upheld through international financial institutions. These organisations,
he said, cling to “obsolete” ideas and that it is imperative to “build a new international
economic order that is open to new emerging economic powers” (cited in Danubrata
and Greenfield, 2015).
This language suggests a more active challenge to the international order than
under Yudhoyono. However, as Prashanth Parameswaran (2014) has highlighted,
Widodo faces a range of foreign policy challenges, a number of which are very
relevant to his capacity to progress SSC/SSTC. A key one is ensuring “that Indo-
nesia’s rising nationalism does not undermine its internationalist outlook” (Para-
meswaran, 2014: 158). Widodo has flamed nationalist sentiments and seems to have
a limited interest in foreign policy matters, which does not bode well for SSC. There
is also a “gap between Indonesia’s commitments and the limited resources it has to
implement them” (Parameswaran, 2014: 157), one that is becoming more intense.
Triangular cooperation provides one avenue to help overcome this constraint, which
is among the reasons why Indonesia has pursued it – yet this pathway locks
Southern countries into the Northern aid architecture, as triangular cooperation
partners to date have all been traditional donors.
Malaysia
As noted, Malaysia became very active in the second phase of SSC in the 1980s under
Mahathir. He established the political and technical components of Malaysia’s SSC, and
these directions continued to be taken under his respective successors Abdullah Badawi
and Najib Razak – though they adopted softer and more pragmatic styles in foreign
policy (Dosch, 2014; Saravanamuttu, 2010). It is too early to say what the return of
Mahathir in 2018 will mean for the country. But SSC in its various forms sat quite well
with the four official themes that assumed a prominent place in Malaysian foreign policy
under Abdullah and then Najib: non-alignment or neutrality (meaning balancing and
hedging Western dominance), regionalism as a pathway to promoting peace and stabi-
lity, engaging with globalisation, and Islam (Saravanamuttu, 2010).
Both Abdullah’s and Najib’s tenuous political positions meant foreign policy and
SSC took a back seat under their respective rule. Rather than SSC, there was a focus on
Engel 229
improving bilateral relations with Singapore, the United States, Australia, and China.
Foreign policy was focused on improving “Malaysia’s development and its regional and
global position” (Dosch, 2014: 31).8 Nevertheless, one legacy of Mahathir is that
“Malaysia’s voice still carries some weight in the Global South, and particularly in
the Islamic world” (Dosch, 2014: 23). Further, its main SSC programme – the
MTCP – attracts quite a bit of attention within SSC discussions. It’s budget has
expanded during the third phase of SSC, but otherwise Malaysia has only pursued a
few minor, new SSC initiatives.9
Since 1980, the MTCP has been run under one specialised agency; it grew signifi-
cantly from the new century onwards. In 2006, Malaysia provided USD 16 million or
0.001 per cent of its GNI in total aid to it (UN ECOSOC, 2008). The majority of this was
for technical cooperation, though 36 per cent went to multilaterals – which is a high
figure and can been seen as a form of SSC. There was a 25 per cent increase planned in
technical cooperation between 2006 and 2010 (UN ECOSOC, 2008). By 2010, the
MTCP was estimated at USD 164 million (UN ESCAP, 2011), which is the most recent
data to be found.
Similar to Indonesia’s programme, the MTCP mostly involves long- and short-term
training in Malaysia as well as a number of other activities – including study visits,
technical cooperation, socio-economic development projects, and the supplying of
equipment and materials. The depoliticised view of development as technical inputs to
solve development problems is very clear in its planning documents (e.g. Joint Study on
Effective TC for CD, 2008b). Its top three recipients in 2005 were Indonesia, Myanmar,
and Cambodia (UN ECOSOC, 2008). There has been some focus on Central Asia, which
is unique in the region, and is based partly on shared Islamic identities and partly on the
Central Asian desire to follow certain aspects of Malaysia’s own authoritarian devel-
opmental state model (Stark, 2006).
Malaysia’s main sectors of activity have been public administration, agriculture,
poverty alleviation, investment promotion, information and communications tech-
nology, banking, and the English language (UN ECOSOC, 2008). There is some
overlap here with Indonesia in agriculture and poverty alleviation – in agriculture this
is not surprising because they share areas of expertise, for example, tropical agricul-
ture, farming, and veterinary programmes. Changes to Malaysia’s already neo-liberal
technical cooperation as development programme have added in a focus on the con-
cerns of the PWC. This added to neo-liberal Washington Consensus policies a limited
concern with poverty alleviation and a focus on good governance (Engel, 2010); this is
visible in Malaysia’s contemporary focus on public administration and banking
governance.
Malaysia has also engaged more and more in triangular cooperation, predominantly
with Japan – its biggest partner – and with UN agencies. The focus is in-Malaysia
training, study visits, and placement of third-country officials (UN ECOSOC, 2008).
Malaysia has conducted needs assessment missions jointly with Japan to a range
of countries, which is unique in SSTC across the region; a focus on partner country
needs reflects the most progressive parts of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda. The
230 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 38(2)
influence of Japan on Malaysia’s programme is of note. One joint Malaysia–Japan
study concluded that:
In many ways, much of the design of MTCP has been developed from the approaches/
programmes of other donors. Malaysia has learned much from the modalities used by
donors, especially Japan, and has adopted them for the context of SSC. (Joint Study on
Effective TC for CD, 2008b: 19)
Through triangular cooperation, development is no longer viewed as a competition
between the North and the South – as Mahathir in his first period as prime minister
espoused. Rather, development is a technical project where the North provides resources,
while the South contributes things like contemporary experiences of development (Mor-
varidi and Hughes, 2018). SSC is thus reframed as norm complementing – that is, not
competing with – the traditional aid architecture.
Technical cooperation in areas like agriculture and science can be viewed as pro-
gressive for recipients, but many activities promote neo-liberal development, reflecting
Malaysia’s position as an economically very open state that relies heavily on exports of
intermediate goods. As Saravanamattu notes, it is “an authoritarian capitalist political
regime seeking its ‘neo-mercantilist’ niche” (2010: 185). Mahathir used SSC as part of
his “Asia is different” / “Asian values” argument, reflecting his position as a relatively
dominant prime minister who could challenge the West. His successors lacked the same
degree of domestic political dominance, but their party remained at the forefront until
2018 when it was eventually brought down by the old political elite – shocked into action
by the scale of Najib’s corruption. The focus on domestic issues meant that foreign
policy, SSC, and competition with Indonesia as well as other states for leadership in
Southeast Asia were not a strong priority. It will be interesting to follow now whether
SSC makes a comeback with Mahathir 2.0.
Thailand
The Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) was established in
1950 to coordinate assistance to Thailand, and it started providing TCDC as early as
1963. In 2004, DTEC was replaced by the Thailand Technical Cooperation Agency
(TICA); in 2006, the government announced its role as an “emerging donor” (Joint Study
on Effective TC for CD, 2008a; Wajjwalku, 2011). This shift from recipient to donor
indicates that middle-income countries have internalised SSC as a norm in aid and
development. However, the shift also connects to two long-term Thai foreign policy
themes. These came together under the activist foreign policy of the Thaksin government
(2001–2006), wishing to see the country take a greater leadership role in the region –
including through SSC (Busbarat, 2014; Chachavalpongpun, 2009).
The first theme is the promotion of subregional economic linkages. This started in the
early 1990s with the “Quadrangle Economic Cooperation” programme connecting
China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand through the development of transport corridors.
This fed into the Greater Mekong Subregion Project, and also to Thaksin’s initiative of
the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) – a
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cooperation framework between Thailand and the CLMV countries (Busbarat, 2014).
The second theme is the “Look West” foreign policy initiated by the Chavalit govern-
ment (1996–1997). This aimed to position Thailand as a link between South Asia and
Southeast Asia using the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC); this was later advanced by Thaksin too. These two
themes formed the core of his “Forward Engagement” foreign policy focused on prag-
matic economic cooperation, using both bilateral and multilateral initiatives.10 Thaksin
pursued a leadership role for Thailand in Southeast Asia and, while it was firmly based
on Thai (and Thaksin’s own) economic interests, he did also promote the idea of a shared
Asian identity and self-help in the region (Busbarat, 2014). Thailand’s SSC strategy
directly supported this programme. Its focus has been primarily on the CLMV countries,
though they have cooperated with over 50 other ones (Joint Study on Effective TC for
CD, 2008a).
Thailand’s programme has two core components: First, technical cooperation (run by
TICA). This has the same format as the other TCDC programmes studied here, though
Thailand also sends volunteers to other countries. The programme initially operated in
the areas of agriculture, public health, and education but has since been expanded to
banking, economics, finance, transport, and science and technology, indicating a shift to
a more neo-liberal PWC focus. Assistance is through bilateral programmes, reciprocal
technical cooperation projects, regional and subregional projects, and triangular coop-
eration with traditional donors – which is becoming more and more prominent. By 2008,
Thailand had triangular programmes with at least 12 traditional donors (Joint Study on
Effective TC for CD, 2008a).
The second and largest component of Thai aid – being unique in Southeast Asia – is
concessional loans. This is done through the Neighboring Countries Economic Devel-
opment Cooperation Agency (NEDA) within the Ministry of Finance and, to a lesser
extent, through the Export–Import Bank of Thailand – which the country counts as part
of its SSC activities. NEDA’s main projects are continental transport linkages, and Laos
has been its major recipient (Wajjwalku, 2011). NEDA’s loans are tied – 50 per cent of
procurement must be done in Thailand itself (Wajjwalku, 2011). Of Thailand’s total
official development assistance (ODA) in 2005 – representing 0.05 per cent of GNI – 70
per cent was concessional loans. Meanwhile, 83 per cent was distributed to neighbouring
countries and over 80 per cent was in infrastructure (roads, bridges, dams, power sta-
tions) (UN ECOSOC, 2008).
Between 2010 and 2014, Thai ODA rose from THB 1.49 billion to THB 2.82
billion – with loans now averaging around 30 per cent of the total amount given
(TICA, 2018). The vast majority of loans again went to Laos. As such the focus on
loans has reduced but is nevertheless still substantial – despite the fact that Thailand
itself sought out technical cooperation over loans to maximise its own development
(Joint Study on Effective TC for CD, 2008a). This suggests that Thai SSC is based
more on self-interest than cooperation, though its formal approach is reaping mutual
benefits and self-help (Wajjwalku, 2011). My analysis of SSC complements Pavin
Chachavalpongpun’s (2009) depiction of Thaksin’s foreign policy as “mercantilist,”
with economic elements directly benefitting firms connected to Thaksin and his
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cabinet. Chachavalpongpun argues that these policies reveal “the exploitative nature
of Thailand’s foreign policy towards its less developed neighbours” (2009: 451). Yet
its loans are fairly concessional (UN ECOSOC, 2008); though with current low
global interest rates, the difference between concessional and commercial loans
tends to be quite small.
Mawdsley (2012) notes the intertwining of geoeconomic and geopolitical motivations
in Thailand. In terms of geopolitics, Thailand’s focus on its neighbours is about stability
and security concerns where “it hopes to lessen the risks of disease pandemics, political
instability and large-scale migration” (Mawdsley, 2012: 134). The centrality to Thai
foreign policy of economic growth through building regional economic/production
networks and SSC has continued since 2006, despite a number of post-Thaksin regimes
attempting to differentiate themselves from his foreign and other policies. Further, the
focus on infrastructure loans and on TCDC replicates traditional donor modes (Wajj-
walku, 2011). The fall of the Thaksin government saw Thailand’s capacity for leadership
in Southeast Asia wane, as it returned to its usual pattern of coups and unstable gov-
ernments – this has left most foreign policy enactment to the bureaucracy (Busbarat,
2014). Thailand’s SSC programme does seem to have maintained some momentum post-
Thaksin, but the country is no longer an SSC norm entrepreneur.
Singapore
There has not been much written about Singapore’s SSC efforts, which is interesting
because on the basis of the number of people that it claims to train each year this is likely
the biggest programme in the region by a significant margin. Still, the lack of available
information about the city state’s SSC efforts makes it difficult to determine their exact
nature.11 Although the programme is large in comparison to the wider region, it still
seems small for a country of Singapore’s wealth – which fits with the city state’s unstated
foreign policy intent of not being seen to have developed-country responsibilities.
Indeed, long after the country was classified as a high-income one, leaders occasionally
still claimed Singapore was a developing country. Further, its foreign policy explicitly
argues for formal equality between the countries of the region – it is the strongest
advocate in ASEAN for equal contributions being made by member states.
Still, it is notable that SSC was accepted as a norm by Singapore, and it established a
programme in 1992 – thereby building on earlier ad hoc efforts and programmes. The
SCP is run by the Technical Cooperation Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.12 Similar to the other technical cooperation programmes examined in this
article, SCP focuses on training. It has trained some 80,000 people from 170 countries
and claims to currently provide education to around 7,000 people per year (Singapore
Government, 2011). The primary focus is ASEAN, especially the CLMV countries and
also small island developing states – though, as noted, trainees have come from across
the globe. A 2009 study indicates that transportation has been the primary focus of the
SCP, accounting for around 49 per cent of courses offered (Morohashi, 2009). Trans-
portation includes civil aviation and port management, which Singapore considers
“crucial for safeguarding national security” (Morohashi, 2009: 41). As the country with
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the largest military budget in the region (SIPRI, 2018), security has certainly long been a
key focus for the island nation (Tan, 2015).
Through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, Singapore established a training centre
in each CLMV country and pledged about USD 170 million for the programme. The
largest element of Singapore’s SSC is the Third Country Training Programme (TCTP).
This is a triangular cooperation programme that works with 44 donor countries and
international organisations to provide technical assistance and training. The SCP has a
high level of engagement with emerging donors and with established international
organisations (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, UNDP,
Colombo Plan, IMF, WB, World Trade Organization, and World Intellectual Property
Organization, WIPO, among others). This reflects Singapore’s broader foreign policy
strategy of seeking “diplomatic space” through engagement with key international
organisations (Acharya, 2007; Tan, 2015).
However, the choice of international organisations is also telling – a very large
component of the TCTP is conducted in collaboration with the IMF. This has been
running since 1997 and trained 4,299 officials from the region in macroeconomic and
financial policies (Singapore Government, 2011). Cooperation with the IMF,WTO,WB,
and WIPO demonstrates a strong neo-liberal focus, which is not surprising as Singa-
pore’s economic strategy has long been focused on economic and financial openness and
integration into the global capitalist system (though it does retain a strong – if unspoken –
role for the state). Singapore’s economic strategy also explains the SCP’s focus spe-
cifically on transportation, as it is positioning itself as a regional infrastructure hub with
support from international organisations.13
Singapore’s foreign policy has often been regarded by critics as “self-aggrandizement
at the expense of the region” (Tan, 2015: 333). It has always been based on a strong sense
of vulnerability and a siege mentality as well as a “self-help philosophy” (Tan, 2015:
334). Critics see it also as “a free-rider in global governance” (Tan, 2015: 334, 350); this
has some truth in the SSC realm, where it has committed resources but seemingly not in
line with its significant available wealth. The strong focus on training indicates a very
strategic honing in on areas that benefit its economy and soft power the most. As an
authoritarian state – with the People’s Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew’s son Lee
Hsien Long – Singapore shows little interest in a progressive SSC agenda – growth,
stability, and power remain its overriding concerns.
Conclusion
SSC started in Southeast Asia as a counter-hegemonic expression of discontent with
colonial rule, superpower interventions, and with the exclusion of the Global South from
international rule-making processes and the world economic system. The norm frame-
work has helped shed light on the cascading of SSC across Southeast Asia, emphasising
the interaction between local agency, interests, leadership, and institutions. But focusing
purely on the spread of SSC as a norm masks the fundamental change occurring in the
political ideals underlying SSC, a shift that taking a neo-Gramscian approach illumi-
nates. This perspective – with its focus on broad structural change – explains that calls
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for a New International Economic Order did not resonate in Southeast Asia, despite
Malaysia’s SSC leadership during the 1980s. This is because the regional leaderships
were by this time already committed to illiberal development within a global capitalist
order. During the current third phase of SSC, where a handful of states have sought to
return to a more politically oriented view of SSC, the Southeast Asian countries have
continued to promote SSC as depoliticised technical assistance – reflecting the region’s
largely authoritarian and capitalist political regimes. Still, a focus on norms, as well as on
national and regional drivers, demonstrates the specific flavours present in Southeast
Asia.
Singapore probably has the largest programme in the region, designed to spread a
neo-liberal, free trade approach through, for example, training officials from the region –
in collaboration with the IMF – in macroeconomic policy. The promotion of globali-
sation and some desire to be seen as meeting the appropriate standards of behaviour of a
high-income country – as a norm approach highlights – competes with its foreign policy
tendency to be a free rider in global governance. Thailand’s programme is also largely
neo-liberal as the strong focus therein on loans demonstrates. Loans are not outside the
remit of mainstream development assistance; they were the norm in its early years and
continue to be a dominant modality for some traditional donors as well as for new ones
too, China, for example. Malaysia’s programme was crafted by Mahathir who was a key
norm leader during SSC’s cascading phase. Yet Mahathir’s rhetorical efforts to separate
Malaysia out from the Western camp were belied by the country’s neo-liberal economic
strategy. Under his successors, the country’s technical cooperation programme retained
its depoliticised view of development as a series of problems requiring appropriate
technical expertise – but added in greater focus on governance over poverty
alleviation, in line with the PWC. The growth of illiberalism and corruption meant
there was little actual focus on progressive change.
Indonesia took the most proactive stance in the region on SSC under President
Yudhoyono who sought to reclaim the country’s founding role in it. This continued under
Joko, though with less prominence. Seen in global terms, the Yudhoyono administration
took a middle-of-the-road position on SSC – with its focus on technical cooperation and
knowledge sharing promoting depoliticised development (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018).
Democracy and human rights have since featured in a notable break with Bandung prin-
ciples, likely being prompted – as the norm literature suggests – by a desire for legitimacy in
the post-Suharto transition. However, the approach to democracy – like that to good gov-
ernance and to poverty reduction – has tended to take an attenuated form. Northern donors
have shaped Indonesia’s programme, funding consultancies to establish its rules and
structures and operating through triangular cooperation. Indonesia’s leadership on SSC is
now being undermined by the rising nationalist tone of its domestic political discourse and
by its hostility to some of its ASEAN neighbours, especially Malaysia (Aspinall, 2016).
The shape of SSC debates in Southeast Asia also fits Rosser and Tubilewicz’s (2016)
macroanalysis of donor aid agendas in Asia Pacific, namely as the product of con-
testation between diplomatic, commercial, and development priorities. The states ana-
lysed here have followed the pattern of developmental states in East Asia, where
domestic competition has largely been between aid for commercial or for diplomatic
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purposes. Economic ministries promote commercial ends, while foreign ministries
promote diplomatic ones – the latter being particularly clear in the focus on the ASEAN
region. Somewhat progressive developmental norms – for example local ownership –
were little more than a side influence; however, traditional donors have never progressed
as far on this front as they would have recipients believe (Eyben, 2012).
Rosser and Tubilewicz (2016) studied states whose place in the capitalist order is
more secure than the Southeast Asian ones studied here. The region’s regulatory and
increasingly authoritarian capitalist states are equally uninterested in questioning the
hegemonic order, as is the case in East Asia. Thus, in contrast to the potentially
emancipatory view of middle powers in SSC expressed in some of the literature, this
article concludes that Southeast Asia’s middle powers have not just supported the
development of a technically focused, depoliticised SSC but have facilitated it. Southeast
Asia’s historical role in SSC means that its strong backing for it in contemporary times is
likely to have added to the legitimacy of this reformulated, neo-liberal SSC. Even the
jockeying between Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore ultimately acts to
legitimise technical cooperation as an instrument. And, triangular cooperation is on the
march – being promoted by old donors attempting to retain their legitimacy and
engagement in the internal decision-making of countries in the Global South.
As Schulz explains, the Northern donors’ preference is for cooperating with “second-
wave” emerging economies rather than the BRICs, because they are: “Less aggressive
[ . . . ] in their struggle for a share in global power [ . . . ] focus on joint solutions [ . . . ] and
they are more flexible when engaging in development partnerships” (2010: 3). Further,
he argues that they “generate few contradictions in policy and practices” (Schulz, 2010:
3-4) for DAC donors. Illiberal contemporary Southeast Asia does not just “generate few
contradictions” for the North; the region also relies on the capitalist and global gov-
ernance infrastructure established by it. The norms literature might say that SSC in
Southeast Asia demonstrates conformity with the “normative consensus” of the insti-
tutions of the rulers (Acharya, 2011); however, taking a neo-Gramscian view on the
shared regional economic structure is ultimately more enlightening.
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Notes
1. “New” is in inverted commas here because some of these donors are not new at all; China, for
example, started providing support to fellow socialist states in the 1950s. Thus, “new” is used
here to encompass both new and re-emerging donors.
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2. Amitav Acharya has labelled such expansion norm subsidiarity, which is a “process whereby
local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect,
violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (2011: 95).
3. China and India have had some impact, though the former’s massive programmes tend to be
finance through traditional bilateral mechanisms.
4. In addition to the usual concerns of economic development and security (i.e. ensuring terri-
torial integrity), foreign policy emphasised engagement with the United Nations – especially
peacekeeping and the external promotion of democratic values and human rights (though not
for separatist groups within Indonesia). Engagement with ASEAN and the region remained as
cornerstone of policy. The policy framed the country as an emerging middle power with a
distinct “international identity” as the fourth most populous nation in the world, the largest
national Muslim population, and the world’s third largest democracy (Anwar, 2010). Indo-
nesia’s inclusion in the G20 has been given much prominence in foreign policy, as has been
the inclusion in the so-called CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South
Africa) grouping of emerging economies.
5. The performative element is visible too in the country’s activism in international fora on SSTC –
it was co-chair of the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation for one term
(which came out of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011) and it
was co-chair of the G20 pillar on knowledge sharing. It hosted a Knowledge Sharing Forum in
Bail in 2012, where knowledge hubs in disaster risk reduction, human development and poverty
reduction, and peacebuilding and good governance were launched (Sofjan et al., 2014). This
shows the main pillars of SSC engagement: technical cooperation and knowledge sharing.
6. Indonesian Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP) is coordinated by the Bureau for Techni-
cal Cooperation in the State Secretariat. Its main activities are training programmes; support-
ing study visits to Indonesia for other governments to learn from that country’s experiences, as
well as organising visits by Indonesian officials to other developing countries; apprenticeships
for farmers; and expert group meetings. By the end of 2013, ITCP had more than 4,000
participants from over 90 countries. ITCP first received donor support in 1982, with United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funding. In the 1990s, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) became the major funder (Centre for East Asian Cooperation
Studies, CEACoS, 2010), and there are a range of other donors (Coordination Team of South-
South and Triangular Cooperation, n.d.).
7. Further, there is a tension in these plans between the desire to help fellow developing countries
and potential competition with them in the Indonesian state’s areas of comparative advantage.
This potential competition is seen as a significant force within Southeast Asia.
8. Malaysia has been pretty quiet in ASEAN, even when it had the chair (Dosch, 2014). In the
trade arena, it has focused on bilateral free trade agreements.
9. In 2008, Malaysia launched the International Science, Technology and Innovation Centre for
SSC under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
In 2009, they launched a UNESCO-Malaysia Cooperation Programme to promote SSC in the
Asia Pacific region. In the first year, USD 5 million was provided, and thereafter has come
USD 1 million per year to fund Malaysian expertise, services, and institutions (Malaysia-
UNESCO Cooperation Programme, 2015).
10. A further dimension was the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, its high point being the Asian Bond
Scheme, which was included in the Chiang Mai Declaration in 2003 (Busbarat, 2014).
11. The author requested an interview with the Singapore Cooperation Programme, they initially
agreed and then delayed and eventually declined an interview. They do not publish an annual
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report or other such documents and their website has only limited information – indeed, it
seems to have recently been taken down and replaced with a Facebook page.
12. Before this, Singapore was involved in the Colombo Plan, the Commonwealth Technical
Assistance Program, and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation – and was also
a significant donor to these programmes (Hamid, 2005: 83). The government launched Sin-
gapore Volunteers Overseas in 1991.
13. In 2013, the International Finance Corporation’s Global Infrastructure Facility was located in
Singapore, and in 2015, the World Bank Group established a Singapore Hub for Infrastructure
and Urban Development. The infrastructure agenda was a likely key reason for Singapore’s
support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is concerned about ensuring that
China does not dominate the infrastructure agenda. The country’s technical expertise in
transportation is likely be useful for many developing countries meanwhile.
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